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THE TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN EASTERN GERMANY 
ULRICH JURGENS, LARISSA KLINZING, and LOWELL TURNER* 
Citing case studies based on interviews they conducted in 1991 and 
1992 with labor representatives and managers at six eastern German 
manufacturing firms, the authors argue that the future could hold 
either vigor and growth or stagnation and permanent second-class status 
for the economy and labor movement in eastern Germany, depending 
largely on actor strategy and choice. The rapid spread of privatization 
and open markets is tending to undermine unions' influence, on the one 
hand; but on the other hand, institutional transfer from former West 
Germany (especially of codetermination law and centralized, regional-
level collective bargaining) is giving unions and works councils increased 
possibilities for leverage. 
SINCE the collapse of "Realsozialismus" in the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), the five new eastern 
states of unified Germany have become a 
land of liberated citizens and pioneers, 
and at the same time a land of despair and 
dashed hope. Dreams and disaster roam 
side by side, and nowhere is this more true 
than at the workplace. As millions of 
workers are displaced and thrown out of 
work, millions of others cling to old or 
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Larissa Klinzing is a Senior Lecturer at Humboldt 
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was provided by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 
the Institute for Collective Bargaining at the School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell Univer-
sity, and the Western Societies Program at Cornell 
University. Earlier versions of this paper were 
presented at the German Studies Association Confer-
ence in Los Angeles, September 26-29, 1991, and at 
the American Political Science Association meeting in 
Washington, D.C., August 29-September 1, 1991. 
The authors thank Michael Fichter, Andy Markovits, 
and John Windmuller for useful comments on the 
earlier drafts. 
new jobs, sometimes in despair, sometimes 
with high expectations. In great numbers, 
these workers have elected new works 
councillors and joined western unions, in 
hopes of combating pervasive employ-
ment insecurity and promoting better 
working conditions and rising pay. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the prospects for plant-level industrial 
relations and workers' interest representa-
tion (unions and works councils) in the 
five new states of the former GDR. This 
question is a critical one because (1) the 
stability and nature of industrial relations 
are directly related to the success of work 
reorganization and industrial restructur-
ing (Katz and Sabel 1985; Streeck 1987; 
Jurgens, Malsch and Dohse 1989); (2) 
success or failure in the eastern states will 
have a major impact on the successful 
(West) German model of industrial rela-
tions and on union strength; and (3) the 
future stability of German industrial rela-
tions and especially the economic and 
political strength of German unions can be 
expected to have a major influence on the 
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prospects for a "social Europe," as Euro-
pean economic integration proceeds. 
The evidence we examine concerns 
essential questions of industrial relations 
in eastern Germany: the extent of union 
organization, works council elections, rela-
tions between works councils and unions 
and between works councils and manage-
ment, and collective bargaining outcomes 
and union economic and social policy 
influence.1 We use these findings as 
indicators of the prospects for unions, 
works councils, and the (West) German 
industrial relations model in eastern Ger-
many. The findings are based on broad 
study and analysis of economic and indus-
trial relations developments in eastern 
Germany from 1990 to 1992, as well as on 
interview-intensive case studies of indus-
trial relations at six large eastern firms, 
conducted in 1991 and 1992. 
The Argument: 
Different Outcomes Possible 
Based on the available evidence and our 
own interviews in workplaces in eastern 
Germany, we argue that perspectives both 
of high hope and of despair are solidly 
rooted in contemporary reality. In the 
interaction between markets, politics, and 
institutions, different outcomes are possi-
ble. On the one hand, the spread of 
markets and the accompanying political 
decisions of the Kohl regime (accelerated 
currency union, rapid privatization, mas-
sive layoffs) are tending to weaken unions 
and works councils. As unemployment 
rises toward a quarter of the eastern work 
force (or beyond), employed workers and 
their representatives lose leverage; em-
ployer proposals to keep plants open in 
return for major concessions in the terms 
of employment are difficult to resist.2 
1
 We focus on the firm and plant levels, the 
essential locus of interaction between codetermina-
tion and collective bargaining in Germany. An 
examination of employer associations, union federa-
tions, and national unions is important for future 
research but beyond the scope of this study. 
2
 The official unemployment rate for eastern 
Germany had reached 16.5% by January 1992. But 
over half a million workers were still receiving 
On the other hand, the spread of West 
German institutions to the East, again on 
the basis of political decision, has created 
new opportunities for interest representa-
tion. Under the Works Constitution Act, 
works council elections are required in 
every workplace with five or more em-
ployees; and the newly elected works 
councillors have specific legal rights to 
information, consultation, and, in critical 
matters such as personnel policy and 
incentive systems, codetermination (veto 
rights in management decision-making).3 
Western unions were quick to move into 
the East and sign up new members; 
eastern work force activists interested in 
running for works council or union 
positions have been equally quick to join 
the western unions. For both institutional 
and political reasons, German businesses 
cannot employ a nonunion strategy like 
the Southern strategy of U.S. employers as 
German capital moves East. Unions have 
signed up new members in great numbers 
(the IG Metall, for example, grew from 
2.6 to 3.6 million members from 1990 to 
1991; Fichter 1991:31); included in these 
numbers are most works councillors, who 
now find themselves with important legal 
rights at a time when management must 
reorganize work extensively. 
Market and institutional forces, then, 
are pushing to a significant extent in 
short-time compensation, a disguised form of unem-
ployment insurance (Week in Germany, February 7, 
1992, p. 4). German research institutes were predict-
ing a rise in unemployment in the new eastern states 
to 20—28% or more (European Industrial Relations 
Review, Vol. 215, December 1991, p. 14). In the 
meantime, it was clear that without a "massive 
application of employment policy instruments" (such 
as short-time, early retirement, job creation, and 
full-time training), unemployment would be close to 
40% (Employment Observatory: East Germany, May 
1992, p. 3). Particular groups such as workers over 
55 and women were especially hard hit. By April 
1992, for example, women accounted for 62.9% of 
the unemployed in the East (Ibid., p. 2). 
3
 The Works Constitution Act, passed in 1952 and 
amended in 1972, is the basic national legislation that 
establishes and regulates works councils. For useful 
English language introductions to codetermination 
and industrial relations in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, see Streeck (1984) and Berghahn and 
Karsten (1987). 
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opposite directions.4 In this open period 
of transformation, we argue that different 
outcomes are possible, dependent in part 
on broader economic developments within 
the EC and Eastern Europe, but depend-
ing to a significant degree as well on actor 
strategy and choice: political decisions 
made by federal and state governments 
(and influenced by organized representa-
tives of labor and management); strategies 
developed by employers and unions; the 
ability of each side to organize and 
mobilize; and the outcomes of bipartite 
and tripartite negotiations. In part be-
cause the great political transformation of 
1989—90 (die Wende, as the Germans call it) 
caught all actors unprepared, the constel-
lation of winners and losers, of risk and 
opportunity, was and remains open to an 
extent quite unusual in political, eco-
nomic, and social history. 
The Argument Situated 
Two views predominate in the discus-
sion of the current transformation in 
eastern Germany. One view holds that as 
western institutions and markets are trans-
ferred to the East, it is only a matter of 
time (5-10 years) before unified Germany 
will look just like the former West Ger-
many. This was the view of the govern-
ment and the leading economic research 
institutes in the first two years after the 
wall came down (1990—91). But this view, 
based on shaky econometric projections, 
downplayed the profound social, eco-
nomic, and political dislocations taking 
place in the new eastern states and has 
been increasingly discredited by the facts. 
A 1992 estimate from the German Insti-
tute for Economic Research in Berlin, in 
fact, claimed that it will take 20 years to 
bring eastern German standards of living 
up to western levels.5 
Another view is more pessimistic, for 
the eastern economy in general and for 
German unions in particular (Mahnkopf 
4
 In can be argued, however, that markets are 
themselves institutions that vary cross-nationally in 
structure and organizing rules (Hall 1986: 35-36). 
5
 Week in Germany, February 14, 1992, pp. 4 -5 . 
1991). In this view, the unions, surpris-
ingly resilient in the past, will finally be 
overtaxed and unable to overcome the 
tensions and contradictions within an 
east-west segmented economy and work 
force. What remains of the eastern work 
force may simply be organized into ex-
tended assembly lines for more advanced 
western plants (Voskamp and Wittke 
1991), while eastern Germany becomes a 
long-term less developed region (a perma-
nent Mezzogiorno) for Germany as a 
whole. Able to play eastern and western 
work forces off against each other in order 
to secure concessions, German employers 
will increasingly dominate German indus-
trial relations while German unions finally 
experience the decline so common to 
other advanced industrial societies. 
Our view is situated between these two 
perspectives. Neither institutions nor mar-
kets, we argue, can simply be transferred 
from west to east. Institutional transfer, as 
always, must build on existing materials. 
This was true for postwar Japan and West 
Germany (where institutional reconfigura-
tion was based on established demands or 
traditions such as employment security 
and works councils, respectively; one did 
not simply build anew); and it is true today 
throughout Eastern Europe (Stark 1992). 
Institutional transformation, therefore, in-
cludes much conflict and negotiation, in 
processes that include both substantial 
risks and positive opportunities for inno-
vation. Not only will industrial relations in 
eastern Germany be transformed, but the 
tensions and new outcomes will very likely 
transform industrial relations in all of 
Germany, in quite unpredictable ways. 
But we are not just hedging our bets. 
We expect that German unions, as organi-
zations, may do reasonably well in extend-
ing their influence into the East, and that 
workplace codetermination, at least as it is 
practiced in the West, will, after a transi-
tion period, be firmly established there. 
These outcomes will result from the 
leverage afforded unions by entrenched 
(West) German institutions of codetermi-
nation and nationally coordinated collec-
tive bargaining. Our causal argument 
(emphasizing institutional transfer), our 
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conceptualization of the process of change 
(beginning with pre-existing material, 
including institutional remnants), and our 
cautiously optimistic predictions for the 
future of German unions and industrial 
relations are based on the findings of our 
present research. 
The Findings: A New Framework 
for Industrial Relations 
Economic disaster, at least in the short 
run, has been the dominant post-unifica-
tion reality in the new German states. The 
collapse of production and employment in 
the former GDR began with economic and 
monetary union on July 1, 1990, and 
continued with the collapse of Eastern 
European and Soviet economies, as the 
products of eastern industry faced both 
the loss of traditional protected markets in 
Eastern Europe and new competition at 
home from more desirable western prod-
ucts. By winter 1991, vast permanent 
reductions in personnel had taken place 
throughout the economy, especially in 
manufacturing; and in major branches of 
the economy, over 50% of the work force 
was on "short-time work" (Kurzarbeit), 
most of these still paid but not working at 
all. The Treuhandanstalt (the government-
established agency in charge of the former 
GDR's economic assets) hoped to stimulate 
market-led firm restructuring by an em-
phasis on privatization and massive per-
sonnel reduction. Many eastern firms, 
spun off by the Treuhand from the large 
Kombinate (the vast integrated corpora-
tions of the GDR that included most 
economic and much social life), were in 
fact taken over by western firms through 
purchase or joint venture and converted 
at least temporarily into low-cost length-
ened assembly lines for the core plants of 
the West. 
The survival chances of eastern firms 
were greatly enhanced by takeover or 
close collaboration with western firms. 
Independent efforts were difficult both 
because the spunoff firms were burdened 
with a "fair share" of the huge debt of the 
former Kombinate, making new financing 
difficult to secure, and because the new 
firms lacked the latest technology and 
access to Western markets and therefore 
needed some kind of fusion with market 
leaders. 
One of the major actors in this transi-
tion period is the Treuhandanstalt, through 
which government economic policy in the 
eastern states is implemented. The Treu-
hand's mission is threefold: to privatize, to 
restructure and redevelop, and, where 
appropriate, to liquidate. Within the 
Treuhand, there has been considerable 
debate over questions of strategic orienta-
tion. Although some have called for a 
focus on proactive restructuring (or "rede-
velopment"), in practice the upper hand 
has gone to those who see privatization as 
the quickest path to restructuring.6 
Unions along with works councils at the 
large Treuhand-cont ro l led firms have 
sharply criticized the Treuhand for two rea-
sons: the absence of codetermination in stra-
tegic decision making (especially for works 
councillors, who claim that their many ideas 
for firm restructuring are typically ignored 
in Treuhand decisions); and the weak em-
phasis on proactive restructuring and rede-
velopment, resulting in a rush to lay off 
workers.7 By the summer of 1991, under 
pressure from unions, works councils, and 
political parties, the Treuhand had begun 
to alter its course somewhat: a negotiated 
agreement on the establishment of employ-
ment and training companies (BQGs: Bes-
chdftigungs- und qualifizierungsgeselkchafteri) 
for the displaced, spun off from Treuhand 
firms, led to the rapid spread and growth of 
BQGs in the new eastern states (see below); 
6
 By February 1992, the Treuhand had privatized 
about half of its holdings (Week in Germany, March 6, 
1992, p. 5) and cut the total work force at its firms by 
about half (see projections in Kuhl et al. 1991: 503). 
After subdividing the former Kombinate, the Treu-
hand ended up with 10,537 firms under its control 
(Treuhandanstalt 1991: A). 
As an example of the speed of privatization-
driven restructuring and its accompanying turmoil 
for eastern work forces, the case of Maschinenbau 
Takraf, a machinery building firm in Leipzig, is 
widely cited. In June 1990, the firm had 58 
workshops employing 30,000 workers; by October 
1991, 5 plants remained, employing a total of 10,000 
workers (Silddeutsche Zeitung, October 26-27, 1991, p. 
35). 
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and labor's influence appeared to grow on 
the state-level Treuhand advisory boards.8 
Most controversially, the Treuhand, both at 
the firms it has privatized and at those it 
continues to control, has organized massive 
layoffs and short-time assignments through-
out eastern Germany. 
Managers, also among the major actors 
in the transition period, are attempting in 
one way or another to reorganize produc-
tion to improve productivity, product 
quality, and firm profitability. Where 
firms have acquired western investment or 
ownership, top western managers have 
usually taken over. Although the Treu-
hand drastically reduces personnel prior 
to the new investment (in an explicit deal), 
the ranks of middle management remain 
dominated by the so-called "old red 
socks." These cadres from the old system 
are now supposed to preside over innova-
tions in production processes; but rela-
tions between these middle managers and 
their work forces are not always harmoni-
ous. Five of the six firms we studied 
remained at least partially controlled by 
the Treuhand in this transition period 
(1991-92)—a pattern that appears typical 
throughout the former GDR—further 
limiting managerial discretion in many 
cases. 
Works councils are brand-new institutions 
in the eastern workplaces. Under the old 
system, each workplace had a plant union 
committee (BGL: Betriebsgewerkschaftslei-
tung) dominated by communist party 
members and working closely with man-
agement to implement state-established 
economic and social goals. The BGLs were 
The Treuhand has a supervisory board (Verwal-
tungsrat) that includes four labor representatives. But 
the unionists, in a minority position, have not had 
much influence except in special circumstances. 
During the Hennigsdorf steel strike, for example, 
intense outside pressure made it possible for union-
ists on the board to push through some of labor's 
demands (concerning employment levels, BQG sup-
port, investment, and other personnel issues) for that 
specific case. Although labor's voice has, on the 
whole, been rather weak at the central level, the 
Treuhand also has advisory boards for each individ-
ual state (Beratungsgremien auf Landerebene), and at 
this level unions have become increasingly influential 
since the summer of 1991. 
eliminated in 1990 and replaced with 
interim elected union groups until works 
council elections could be held following 
unification (October 1990) and the spread 
of western law to the East. Among the 
ranks of the newly elected works council-
lors are some old BGL members, some 
middle-to-lower-level union activists from 
the old system, some fresh faces, and, in a 
very few cases, experienced westerners 
who have come in and been elected to 
help set up the new works council. 
Challenges facing these overtaxed bodies 
include learning their new rights and 
responsibilities under the Works Constitu-
tion Act (for which, in many cases, they 
received early training from western 
unionists); negotiating the terms of mas-
sive layoff; and negotiating with manage-
ment the terms and shape of new produc-
tion and work organization. 
The unions from western Germany have 
moved rapidly into the East to take over 
functions of collective bargaining and 
union representation. At the firms we 
examined, the IG Metall, the largest of the 
western unions, had quickly established 
high membership density and provided 
works councillors with training for their 
new roles. At the regional level, the IG 
Metall negotiated collective bargaining 
agreements with employer associations 
that gave eastern workers either 62% or 
68% of western pay levels in 1991, with an 
agreement to reach wage parity by 1994 
and work hours parity by 1998.9 
The old eastern IG Metall (IGM-Ost) was 
dissolved in 1990, and the incoming union 
made the controversial decision to exclude, 
at the outset, all IGM-Ost staff from the 
new union offices (to root out former secret 
police agents).10 The heads of local and dis-
9
 Parity, however, is an elusive goal. Actual wage 
and benefit levels are even lower than the 62-68% 
levels, when all things are considered (WSI-
Mitteilungen, August 1991). Workers in the East, for 
example, are often placed in lower job categories 
than comparable workers in the West; and in the 
public sector, workers have lost much of their 
pay-determining seniority. Real parity will not be 
achieved for many years to come. 
10
 Other unions, such as the chemical workers, 
took a different approach, incorporating to some 
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trict offices of the IG Metall in eastern Ger-
many are now in most cases westerners, al-
though former IGM-Ost leaders and activists 
have been integrated and play important 
roles throughout the union hierarchy. To 
expand into the East, the IG Metall created 
34 new local offices; at the regional level, 
the union created one new district (Dres-
den) and expanded four others (Berlin, 
Hamburg, Hannover, and Frankfurt) to 
cover the new eastern states (Kittner 1991: 
74-78). 
Finally, the work force, that portion not 
already laid off, finds itself under enor-
mous labor market pressure. High unem-
ployment levels, both official and dis-
guised, will no doubt last for years. Many 
of the remaining jobs are undesirable 
ones; skilled workers continue to migrate 
westward; older workers are forced out of 
the work force; women bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the unemployment bur-
den as many are, in effect, sent home to 
care for the children, thereby leaving jobs 
to the male "breadwinners"; and workers 
in general have been completely unpre-
pared for the sudden events that have 
drastically altered their working lives. 
The situation in 1991-92, to many 
workers and work force representatives, 
appeared extremely difficult. As the Treu-
hand continued to sell off or close down 
plants with litde regard for short-term 
employment effects, western investors de-
manded major work force concessions at 
the former GDR plants. Unions and works 
councils were preoccupied with internal 
structure and with the social effects of 
rationalization and plant closings. And by 
mid-1992, it became clear that perhaps the 
biggest problem, and the major source of 
massive unemployment, was the inade-
quate level of private western investment 
in eastern Germany.11 
extent the eastern counterpart union into the 
surviving western union (Kittner 1991:77-78; Fich-
ter 1991). 
11
 Private investment in eastern Germany was 
estimated to be around DM 32.5 billion in 1992, 
compared to DM 54.5 in public investment (for 
telephone, postal services, roads, railroads, and so 
on); and the per capita level of private investment for 
1992 was projected at one-third less in eastern than in 
With the expiration of IG Metall-negoti-
ated employment security on June 30, 1991 
(although government-financed short-time 
pay was temporarily extended), an enor-
mous unemployment crisis loomed. In such 
loose labor markets, the dominance of west-
ern capital in the industrial arena appeared 
fundamentally unchallenged, in spite of high 
union membership levels and active new 
works councils. Individuals with the inde-
pendent capacity to articulate interests were 
rare: coming from the West, they may have 
had clean, uncompromised histories but of-
ten found litde acceptance in the East; com-
ing from the East, they had typically made 
their careers under the old regime. The IG 
Metall's honeymoon period in the East was 
clearly drawing to a close; works councillors 
repeatedly criticized western-led union pol-
icies and contract settlements as insensitive 
to the problems faced by their own work 
forces. After a year or more in office, many 
works councillors were disillusioned by what 
had become their primary task: negotiating 
the terms of massive unemployment. 
But we saw positive signs as well. In 
each of the six cases we studied, union 
membership density in 1991 was 90% or 
above, matching or exceeding rates at 
comparable plants in the West.12 Shop 
steward structures, based on rank-and-file 
elections, existed or were in the planning 
stages, in collaboration both with local 
union offices and with works councils. 
Works councillors, although anxious and 
under great stress, were nonetheless in 
some cases still hopeful about what they 
could accomplish, and actively engaged 
western Germany (Der Spiegel, June 15, 1992, pp. 
100-103). Reasons given for unexpectedly low levels 
of investment include low productivity and conse-
quent high unit labor costs, unresolved property 
ownership questions and claims, and inadequate 
infrastructure and institutions. 
12
 Membership density, to be sure, is not the same 
thing as organizational strength. Many eastern 
workers were resigned to very difficult circumstances 
and saw union membership as an insurance policy, 
especially in the event of threatened unemployment. 
This situation, of course, is not unlike what one often 
finds within the traditional unions of western 
societies. But by 1992, although no broad data were 
yet available, membership rates appeared to be 
dropping; certainly there was a decline at several of 
the plants we visited. 
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with both management and the work force 
on a number of fronts. The works 
councillors we interviewed had all been 
through IG Metall training programs to 
learn the rights to information, consulta-
tion, and participation granted them un-
der the law (although they were also 
disappointed by the limitations of those 
rights). After the layoffs and mass disloca-
tion, the remaining workers appeared 
eager to learn and to show that they could 
produce at western levels if given the 
chance (with appropriate technology and 
organization). We found works councillors 
and managers collaborating on new work 
organization that in some cases included 
shopfloor innovations such as teamwork. 
And we found examples of close East-
West collaboration within union offices 
and works councils and in works council-
union relations. 
The Findings: Four Types of Firms 
More important than distinctions of 
sector, product, or process in this transi-
tion phase appeared to be prospects for 
firm survival and future production. On 
this dimension, we have identified the 
following four types of firms. 
(A) Firms taken over by a major west-
ern multinational corporation and 
integrated into a worldwide or 
Europeanwide corporate strategy. 
These firms have a high probability 
of success, with production profiles 
dependent on strategic decisions at 
corporate headquarters. 
(B) Firms linked directly to western 
investment, through ownership or 
joint venture. These firms are inte-
grated into western market and 
production strategies and have at 
least the possibility of moderniza-
tion through new investment. 
(C) Firms spun off from the large 
Kombinate and seeking either west-
ern partners or survival as indepen-
dent units. 
(D) Firms going under. 
Although we gathered background in-
formation on many firms, we decided to 
focus on six representative case studies, to 
examine industrial relations developments 
in detail. We chose one firm of type A, two 
of type B, two of type C, and one of type 
D. The firms we looked at were in the 
automobile, heavy machinery, and elec-
tronics sectors.13 In each case, the work 
force had elected new works councillors 
under the Works Constitution Act of the 
Federal Republic, and workers in large 
numbers had transferred union member-
ship from IGM-Ost to the western IG 
Metall. These are all large firms, parts of 
the former Kombinate, but large firms are 
typical of current industry structure in the 
new federal states. In this study, we did 
not look at small and medium-sized firms, 
although what happens to these firms as 
they emerge (they hardly existed in the 
past in the sectors we have looked at), 
their networks, and their relations to 
larger firms are crucial subjects of study 
for continuing and future research. 
From what we learned of other plants 
and firms both before and after our initial 
case studies of June 1991, we believe that 
the four types we have identified are 
broadly characteristic of firms in eastern 
Germany, at least in manufacturing. 
Types A and B: Recipients of 
Western Investment 
Type A and B firms, usually through 
takeover, have received substantial invest-
ment from a western firm. Prospects for 
survival are good, but only after major 
restructuring. After currency union (on 
July 1, 1990, when GDR marks were 
13
 Our research was interview-intensive, con-
ducted for the most part in June 1991, with 
follow-up interviews in June 1992. We visited each 
firm at least twice and used an open-ended, intensive 
interview approach with a limited number of 
well-placed subjects. We conducted 32 interviews in 
all, typically 2-3 hours in length. The majority of our 
interviews were with elected works councillors, well 
placed for our purposes between employer and 
union; but we also conducted several interviews both 
with managers and union representatives. Although 
we promised confidentially to our interviewees (for 
obvious organizational reasons), we can supply the 
names of the firms, upon request, to interested 
researchers. 
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converted to western marks), these firms 
typically lost much of the market for their 
products, which meant large-scale reduc-
tions in personnel, product offerings, and 
research department size. In all cases, 
most remaining workers have joined the 
appropriate western union (for our three 
cases, the IG Metall) and participated in 
the election of new works councillors. 
Although some former (BGL) union 
leaders have been elected to works council 
positions, most of the new works council-
lors are former low-to-middle-level union 
officials or new faces. These works coun-
cillors, without exception, have shown an 
active interest in working with manage-
ment to restructure the firm and expand 
production. They have received works 
council training from the IG Metall and 
intend to use codetermination rights to 
the fullest. They are disappointed that 
those rights are limited to information and 
consultation in important matters such as 
strategic planning and investment deci-
sions; but they have engaged themselves 
with western managers, local managers, 
western works council counterparts, and 
IG Metall representatives in an attempt to 
gain maximum leverage. 
Four goals that the new works councils 
have particularly emphasized are (1) mo-
bilizing the work force to work hard and 
flexibly, to convince top western manage-
ment to invest more in their plants; (2) 
obtaining new technology and training for 
the work force; (3) developing and pre-
senting to management new ideas for 
production (for both product and pro-
cess), based on past experience and estab-
lished work patterns and potential in the 
plants; and (4) promoting the develop-
ment of employment companies (BQGs), 
to employ and retrain displaced workers. 
The first goal obviously provides a solid 
common ground for labor-management 
collaboration, which appears strong at 
these plants in spite of works council 
dissatisfaction with the management re-
sponse to the second, third, and fourth 
initiatives. 
The type A firm we visited is an auto 
producer in Saxony. In this case, a large 
(West) German auto firm bought a plant 
where East German autos were produced 
until 1990. By mid-1991, this multina-
tional firm had rehired 1,250 workers 
(from a pool of 12,000 former workers at 
this and nearby plants of the same 
Kombinat) and begun to produce western 
model cars. In the meantime, the firm is 
building a new plant, scheduled to open in 
1994, adjacent to the currently function-
ing one; personnel plans include gradual 
additional hiring to reach a 1994 total of 
5,500. Long-term investment here ap-
pears secure. 
Top plant and firm management (the 
firm is structured as an independent 
subsidiary of the parent firm) are excited 
about the new operation here, viewing it 
as an opportunity to introduce innova-
tions. From both management and the 
works council, we heard this plant re-
ferred to as a sort of eastern NUMMI.14 
Management intended, for example, to 
introduce early on a comprehensive struc-
ture of 8—12-member workteams; and 
works councillors were hopeful about the 
development of a new type of mitwirkender 
Mitarbeiter (engaged co-worker, or team 
worker). 
Although top management is from the 
parent firm, most middle-level managers 
come from the ranks of the former 
managers from the communist system. 
The parent firm has done assessment 
testing and screening and is convinced 
that many of the former managers are 
flexible and can function well, with re-
training, in the new environment. Top 
management was also pleasantly surprised 
by the skills and flexibility of the existing 
work force. 
Newly elected works councillors come 
mainly from the ranks of former low-to-
mid-level union activists. Prior to the 
election (in April 1991), however, these 
activists sought out a westerner to help 
them learn how to negotiate under the 
Works Constitution Act with an experi-
14
 New United Motor Manufacturing (NUMMI) is 
the acclaimed GM-Toyota joint venture plant in 
Fremont, California, that achieved path-breaking 
productivity and quality levels using innovations such 
as shopfloor teamwork (Turner 1991: 53-62). 
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enced western top management. Through 
the IG Metall they found an experienced 
works councillor, from a western plant of 
the parent firm, who was willing to get 
involved. The firm was persuaded to put 
him on the books so that he could run for 
office on the works council, to which he 
was elected with the highest number of 
votes. The new works council chose him as 
chairperson; and the newly elected group 
began the task of coalescing as a leader-
ship team and beginning to analyze infor-
mation and negotiate with management. 
The new works councillors received train-
ing from and stayed in close contact with 
both the IG Metall and the parent firm's 
general works council in the West. 
With investment secured and solid pros-
pects of continued hiring, the mood here 
was upbeat. Works councillors criticized IG 
Metall's regional contract, which would keep 
their work force underpaid relative to west-
ern counterparts for years to come (with 
lower pay, fewer holidays and vacation days, 
weaker benefits, and smaller bonuses). But 
they all belonged to the IG Metall and looked 
to the union for support, as did virtually the 
entire work force. Labor-management rela-
tions appeared quite positive: management 
was hopeful that the works council would 
be willing collaborate in the development of 
innovative production organization, and 
works councillors intended to use their legal 
rights and bargaining power to press for 
human-side concerns based, for example, 
on the IG Metall's principles of group work 
(such as a broad assignment of varying tasks: 
see Muster and Wannoffel 1989; Turner 
1991: 113-14). Both sides were hopeful that 
this plant could stimulate the development 
of a modernizing network in this area of 
Saxony. 
At type B plants, the going was more 
difficult. In this category were a producer 
of brake parts and a producer of power 
plant machinery, both headquartered in 
eastern Berlin. Both firms had been taken 
over by a western producer of similar 
products. In each case, works councillors 
were preoccupied both with the joint 
effort with local management to secure 
new technology and training for local 
plants and with the effort to build employ-
ment companies for the displaced. 
Again, plant management consisted 
mainly of former communist managers, 
whereas the newly elected works councils 
included a mix of former union leaders 
and new people. At one of the firms, the 
former BGL leader had survived to head 
up the new works council (where five of 
the fifteen elected members came from 
the old BGL); at the other firm, a former 
BGL member (who had nonetheless never 
been a party member) was elected to head 
the new works council, to which most 
former union leaders were not elected. 
Although works councillors at both 
firms had joined the IG Metall and 
claimed to have good relations with their 
western counterparts, their role, they told 
us, was quite different from the usual role 
of western works councillors. In their case, 
the primary task was to work with man-
agement (both local and from the West) to 
convince top western executives to in-
crease investment in these eastern plants. 
They mobilized their work forces to work 
hard and flexibly, prepared to make a 
variety of concessions, and gave ideas to 
management regarding product and pro-
cess strategies. In their willingness to make 
concessions (such as weekend work and 
night shifts) and their close collaboration 
with management, they came into conflict 
at times with representatives of the IG 
Metall and western works councils. 
Although they valued union member-
ship for the training and other support 
offered and for the long-term prospects 
for collective bargaining, works council-
lors at both firms voiced the complaint 
that "Wessi" unionists did not understand 
their problems. To a large extent, they 
had to fall back on their own resources, to 
work with management to solve their own 
firm and plant problems. They were 
disappointed that their input had largely 
been ignored by the Treuhand in its 
decisions regarding layoffs, product strat-
egies, production organization, and firm 
sale; and they complained that their voice 
had been minimal in regional-level IG 
Metall strategy and leadership selection. 
They claimed to have an important contri-
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bution to make based on their experience 
and work relations in the plants, a 
contribution they were now making to 
some extent in local and corporate labor-
management relations. Management at 
both firms, especially top management, 
appeared to rely on the works councils to 
contribute ideas and help organize the 
work force. 
Type C: Independent Survivors 
Type C firms are firms spun off from the 
old Kombinate by the Treuhand and 
attempting to restructure and survive on 
their own, with no major western invest-
ment in the short run.15 Because their 
ideas for restructuring received little sup-
port during the Treuhand's period of 
control, these firms lost valuable time and 
market share. These firms are character-
ized by insecure management; westward 
migration of highly qualified white- and 
blue-collar workers; wide fluctuations in 
performance and prospects; confrontation 
between management and works council 
over both control of the firm and the 
social demands of the work force; and the 
decentralization of the firm into profit 
centers or other units, fighting for survival 
at that level. 
The type C firms we visited were an elec-
tronics engineering firm in eastern Berlin 
and a large auto firm in Saxony. The elec-
tronics firm had been subdivided into 16 
profit centers (with the help of western con-
sultants), each now struggling to develop 
products, show profit, and acquire targeted 
investment. Elected on the basis of the profit 
center structure, the works council, along 
with top management, was the only firm-
wide body and therefore played an impor-
tant role in shaping company policy. All 
former union leaders had been swept aside 
in works council elections, making this the 
only old-red-socks-free works council in our 
sample. The new works councillors claimed 
to have as much influence in developing firm 
15
 Of 2,400 sales reported by the Treuhand as of 
September 1991, 653 were management buy-outs 
(Treuhandanstalt 1991:1.20) that fit into this cate-
gory. 
product strategy and process innovation as 
company management. Relations between 
labor and management were thus very close 
but also tense, since it was not at all clear just 
who was in charge. 
Because the last East German autos had 
already rolled off the line, the auto firm in 
Saxony was desperate for new product 
strategies and grasping at many different 
straws. The old BGL leader had survived 
politically to be elected head of the new 
works council; he now worked closely with 
management to decide such questions as 
which auto parts the firm could continue 
to produce and which parts of the firm 
could be viable. 
A major preoccupation at both of these 
plants was the establishment of employ-
ment companies, to use unneeded or obso-
lete resources of the firm to provide jobs 
and training (and perhaps even sustainable 
production strategies) for the many dis-
placed workers. Our 1991 visit to the firm 
in Saxony, in fact, coincided with a highly 
publicized plant occupation there by a thou-
sand workers, protesting Treuhand poli-
cies. It was in the wake of this clash and 
other protests and occupations that the 
Treuhand negotiated, with unions, employ-
ers, and state governments, its compromise 
agreement on the establishment of employ-
ment companies (see below). 
By the summer of 1992, one of these 
type C firms was in the process of being 
taken over by a group of western inves-
tors; the other was actively seeking such 
western investment. Although cases of 
successful management buy-out can be 
found in eastern Germany, independent 
survival proved impossible in the end for 
the two cases we looked at—which, we 
suspect, are quite typical. 
Type D: Firm Failures 
In this category are firms with products 
that proved obsolete after the Berlin Wall 
came down. In these cases, the Treuhand 
has orchestrated liquidation; employees 
received short-time compensation while 
either staying home or seeking new em-
ployment (for most, short-time pay lasted 
until the end of 1991); and work force 
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representatives were preoccupied with 
negotiating employment and training op-
portunities for the displaced work force. 
In many such firms, new works council 
elections took place even as liquidation 
proceeded. 
The one type D firm we visited was a 
producer of consumer electronics goods 
that simply could not begin to compete 
with western radios and stereos. Various 
attempts were made under a succession of 
top managers to salvage the firm by 
securing western investment and shifting 
to new products. After these attempts 
failed, machinery was sold off and the 
buildings were sold. 
The former BGL union leader managed 
to survive politically as the newly elected 
chair of the works council. In the final 
months of the firm's life, he and the other 
works councillors put their main efforts 
into negotiating work force protections in 
the face of imminent mass layoffs. The 
works council secured employment com-
mitments for 700 workers (out of a total 
1989 work force of 3,200 at the electronics 
company). And the works council also 
secured the establishment of an employ-
ment and training company, which the 
works council chairperson would now 
direct and which could employ several 
hundred more displaced workers. In 
1990, most of the work force had joined 
the IG Metall, which had given training to 
the new works councillors and supported 
the establishment of the employment 
company. 
Findings: The Politics of New 
Work Organization 
What kind of work organization will 
emerge as a general pattern in the new 
states—advanced and innovative or tradi-
tional—is a question that remains unre-
solved. In two of our six cases (the type A 
firm and one of the type B firms), 
employers appeared determined to bring 
in advanced technology and flexible work 
organization, and to use the eastern plants 
for modern, up-to-date production. In 
these cases, management relied on skilled, 
flexibly deployed work forces. In the 
remaining cases, the oudines of projected 
production strategies were still unclear. 
For many works councillors, a major 
problem was the prevalence of the former 
managers in the ranks of the "new" 
middle management.16 Where firms have 
secured substantial western investment, 
top western managers have decided, on 
the basis of testing and experience so far, 
that many of these individuals are quite 
suitable for current management respon-
sibilities. Although experienced in manag-
ing eastern work forces, these middle 
managers are in some cases widely disliked 
by their employees. As studies in the 
United States and other countries have 
shown, new approaches and attitudes on 
the part of middle managers are critical 
for the success of work reorganization 
strategies, especially when those strategies 
call for a more committed work force and 
new relations of labor-management collab-
oration and trust (Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie 1986; Milkman 1990; Turner 
1991). 
Union Prospects 
Works council—union relations are and 
will continue to be difficult. The tensions 
inherent in a system of dual representa-
tion, including dangers well known in the 
West such as "plant egoism" (manifested 
when works councils put the interests of 
their own plant over broader union and 
working-class interests: see Windolf and 
Hohn 1984; Hohn 1988), can only be 
magnified when union leadership from 
one political culture encounters works 
council leadership from another. 
Although we heard works councillors 
express pride in their new IG Metall 
membership and appreciation for the 
support they had received in matters such 
as training, we also heard of western 
paternalism and a lack of understanding 
16
 Some of the works councillors we interviewed 
are, to be sure, old red socks themselves. And many 
of these former functionaries in labor and manage-
ment have both expertise and a genuine willingness 
to contribute to the new system. But getting beyond 
the old and more recent wounds to work together in 
new ways is a protracted process, and one that 
permeates contemporary eastern German society. 
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of the problems of eastern work forces. 
Works councillors, for example, who 
wanted to allow their work forces to work 
three shifts and weekends (and claimed 
work force support for such efforts to 
prove that their plant deserved to remain 
open and receive new investment), com-
plained of IG Metall interference.17 Newly 
elected works councillors, as we have seen, 
also complained that regional-level con-
tracts will keep them a second-class work 
force through the end of the decade. And 
works councillors at several firms claimed 
that at the upper levels the union is not 
democratic, that their concerns are not 
taken into consideration, and that internal 
processes remind them in some ways of 
the old East German unions. 
In spite of its rapid growth in member-
ship, therefore, the IG Metall is far from 
secure in its position in the new states. 
Works councillors at type B and C firms 
said they would do what was necessary for 
their own work forces regardless of the 
wishes of the national union; and they 
claimed the support of their own work 
forces for such action. Some predicted 
that union membership, after the initial 
rush to join based both on insecurity and 
hope, would decline to more "realistic" 
levels in the face of disillusionment with 
union policies. 
We did not find the commonly depicted 
passive eastern work force, demoralized 
and used to doing what it is told after 40 
years of communism. In fact, we found 
generally skilled work forces used to 
improvising and problem solving within 
inefficient economic structures (see also 
Kern 1991; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). 
Workers, at least as reported by their 
elected works councillors, wanted more 
influence on work organization in the new 
system; and they wanted more rank-and-
17
 In a long-standing policy, popular in the West, 
the IG Metall opposes except in exceptional circum-
stances both three-shift and weekend work. The 
latter has been a postwar sacred cow for the West 
German labor movement; and the "free weekend," so 
the argument goes, can only be maintained if it is 
defended across the board. Weekend work regula-
tions have nonetheless been loosened in recent years 
in the West in plant-level agreements. 
file democracy within the union. In some 
cases, they were ripe for spontaneous 
mobilization, as numerous plant occupa-
tions in 1991 indicate. 
What role will these workers play in 
their new unions in the future? Some have 
argued that the conjunction of western 
unionists bringing their new mission to the 
East and encountering vast passive work 
forces will seriously set back western 
processes of internal union regeneration 
and democratization (Mahnkopf 1991).18 
Other outcomes, however, are clearly 
possible. Eastern workers may, if they 
encounter western union leaders whose 
condescending treatment reminds them of 
their old union bosses, simply drop out of 
the unions. On the other hand, these 
eastern workers, and especially their 
elected shop stewards and works council-
lors, may join the push for what the 
Germans call Basis-Demokratie (grass-roots 
democracy). Several times in our inter-
views, we heard from works councillors 
that they and their colleagues would either 
hold the union at a distance or fight within 
for reform and democratization. It is not 
inconceivable that eastern workers, fed up 
with paternalism and authoritarianism 
from any source, could become important 
allies of those in the West promoting 
internal union democracy. 
Active Labor Market Policy: 
Employment Companies 
The campaign for employment and 
training companies (BQGs) provided a 
major focus for union and works council 
mobilization in 1991. Works councillors at 
every firm we visited were pushing for the 
establishment and funding of employment 
companies to provide job creation and 
retraining for the displaced. In the spring 
and summer of 1991, the Treuhand, as 
the primary agent responsible for laying 
off workers, found itself under great 
pressure to support the BQGs. The 
18
 Mahnkopf also argues persuasively that the 
growing environmental emphasis of western unions 
could fall victim as well to the more immediate 
economic needs of eastern workers. 
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pressure was internal, from works councils 
at Treuhand-controlled firms and from 
workers who in some dramatic cases 
occupied plants to press their demands, 
and external, from the unions and state 
and local governments. Wary about the 
impact of such publicly financed compa-
nies on the broader goal of rapid privati-
zation, the Treuhand nonetheless ac-
cepted the BQG concept as a way to soften 
the impact of massive layoffs. 
The idea behind these companies is to 
combine unused plant (buildings, machin-
ery) with laid-off workers to set up 
temporary production and training that 
could lead to new jobs for the displaced. 
The major source of funding for the 
BQGs is the Federal Labor Bureau (BA: 
Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), which, because of 
the magnitude of its payouts for unem-
ployment, short-time work, and now the 
BQGs, has become quite important in the 
new eastern states. Heinrich Franke, BA 
president, argued (in opposition to Jiirgen 
Mollemann, the Economics Minister) that 
the BQGs are in a broad sense revenue-
neutral, since employees do not get unem-
ployment benefits and do produce and 
pay taxes.19 
In July of 1991, Treuhand-union nego-
tiations finally resulted in a framework 
agreement for the establishment of the 
companies, diffusing the conflict.20 In 
return for official support for this major 
policy goal, unions conceded to the Treu-
hand the principle that the BQGs would 
be separate entities with no formal ties to 
or claims on the firms from which workers 
were laid off. Including active participa-
tion by employer associations, state gov-
ernments, and unions, the BQGs offer the 
possibility of substantial adjustment assis-
tance and retraining for eastern workers 
along with a new "social partnership" role 
for the unions. 
In the wake of the July agreement, 
employment companies have been estab-
lished throughout eastern Germany and 
have become an important labor market 
European Industrial Relations Review, Vol. 215, 
(December 1991), p. 15. 
20
 Week in Germany, July 26, 1991, p. 4. 
feature in which unions play an active 
role. The critical question for the future of 
these companies and for the gains that 
unions hope to make by their participation 
is: will the BQGs result in real job creation 
and training, or will they serve mainly to 
disguise long-term unemployment? At the 
very least, these companies cushion unem-
ployment in the East—and for that the 
unions can take credit, since employment 
companies were very much their idea. 
Contending Scenarios 
For the economy of the five eastern 
states, our findings show indications of 
two contrasting developmental scenarios. 
In a modernization scenario, investors make 
use of the advantages of backwardness 
(Gerschenkron 1962) to spur new growth 
in the former GDR. Because much of the 
old plant and organization must be 
cleared away, employers are in a position 
to bring in the latest technology and 
production concepts. They could, for 
example, adopt elements of "lean produc-
tion" (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990) in 
greenfield and semi-greenfield settings, in 
collaboration with flexible work forces 
eager to train for advanced technology 
and work under innovative organizational 
conditions in the drive to secure jobs and 
steady income. In the best case, new 
production concepts, rather than starting 
from scratch, could build on the problem-
solving and collaborative traditions of a 
skilled and flexible eastern work force 
(Kern 1991; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). 
In such a setting, one could imagine 
modernization advances over existing 
practice in western Germany that would 
turn the ex-GDR into a growth region. 
One can also imagine, however, a 
polarization scenario, in which the eastern 
states of unified Germany occupy the 
lower end of a dual economic and social 
structure. In this scenario, Western firms 
invest in the East but only enough to 
exploit the old structures, including out-
dated mass production lines. Using more 
pliable work forces and lower labor costs, 
Western firms establish in the eastern 
states an extension of their assembly 
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operations (Mahnkopf 1991; Voskamp 
and Wittke 1991). The brain drain would 
continue as the most highly skilled eastern 
workers seek better opportunities in the 
West. And the established western states 
of unified Germany would use both new 
demand in the East and favorable produc-
tion terms for firms doing business there 
to spur the further modernization of the 
West—in this case at the expense of the 
East. Union strategies to bargain for 
phased-in wage parity have aimed in part 
at heading off this potential scenario 
(although such strategies may simply de-
flect "Maquiladora" locations to the Polish 
border area, leaving much of eastern 
Germany in a sort of economic develop-
ment limbo).21 
Industrial relations prospects follow 
from broader economic development sce-
narios. The first scenario could include 
innovations in work organization, includ-
ing new forms of labor-management col-
laboration. Managers could introduce 
more flexible working arrangements; 
works councillors could engage in deci-
sion-making processes to promote "hu-
manization" aspects of new work organiza-
tion; and workers could claim more 
shopfloor autonomy and problem-solving 
independence. Innovations such as union-
employer negotiated group work could 
spread more quickly than is possible in the 
West, where, in spite of active efforts to 
negotiate change on the part of both labor 
and management, entrenched structures 
and interests often stand in the way.22 To 
use Olson's terminology, "institutional 
sclerosis" in the East would be cleared 
away, making innovation and new growth 
21
 Because productivity is much lower in the East 
than in the West, unit labor costs are higher in the 
East in spite of overall wage levels about half as high. 
This helps to explain the much lower-than-hoped-for 
levels of private investment so far in the East. Both 
modernization and polarization scenarios require 
rapidly rising productivity in the East. 
It is also possible that modern group work could 
build in part on the eastern tradition of "brigade 
organization," a structure of group organization in 
GDR workplaces. This subject is widely discussed 
among German industrial sociologists and an exam-
ple of how new practices could build on institutional 
remnants from the old system. 
possible (Olson 1982). But (in contrast to 
Olson's argument) there is no necessary 
reason why this scenario could not build 
on existing institutional remnants and 
include strong unions and works councils 
actively engaged in management decision 
making. 
The polarization scenario could also 
include labor-management collaboration, 
in this case based on weak workers' 
interest representation; or this scenario 
could include increasingly adversarial re-
lations. Management would stand clearly 
in command, dispensing strenuous jobs to 
workers with weak (or at least unenforced) 
social and labor rights and little employ-
ment security; and management would be 
in a strong position to drive wedges 
between works councils and unions. Union 
membership density could be expected to 
drop off after the heady organizing 
period of 1990-91, as workers become 
disillusioned. The potential could be 
strong for outbursts of conflict between 
exploitative employers and their bitter 
work forces. 
Government economic policy, Bundes-
bank monetary policy, and Treuhand 
strategies, to be sure, will play important 
roles in determining which scenario is 
dominant. What is actually happening so 
far in eastern Germany appears to include 
both scenarios, with one or the other more 
prevalent in particular areas, industries, 
and firms. This variegated picture will 
most likely persist for some time. The 
critical question, therefore, is whether 
enough modernization will take place in 
enough of eastern Germany to generate 
the networks of growth and innovation 
necessary to overcome polarization. If not, 
centers of innovation may well remain 
"cathedrals in the desert" (Grabher 1992), 
around which the dominant scenario will 
be what we have called polarization. 
Conclusion: Risks 
and Opportunities 
The evidence presented here has indi-
cated both the risks and opportunities for 
German unions and industrial relations, 
and has pointed toward the causal forces 
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at work. It is not just that institutions in 
the East have been scrapped, opening up 
new possibilities. That is part of the story, 
but a more complete answer recognizes 
two conflicting forces at work. The onrush 
of privatization and open markets is, on 
the whole, pushing toward outcomes that 
include weakened influence for workers' 
interest representation. Just as Reagan 
and Thatcher deregulation policies in the 
United States and Britain undercut the 
bases of union influence in those countries 
and contributed to union decline, so the 
Treuhand's neo-liberal policies have both 
kept the unions at arm's length and 
greatly strengthened the hand of manage-
ment in eastern industrial relations. Mas-
sive unemployment has weakened union 
and works council bargaining power and 
offered employers an open choice be-
tween strategies of modernization and 
strategies of exploitation, with the latter 
becoming more tempting than ever. 
At the same time, the spread of western 
institutions of interest representation to 
the East has given unions and works 
councils a strong toehold for present and 
future influence. The union organiza-
tional and political capacity to bargain for 
wage parity in the foreseeable future has 
undercut the attractiveness of old-plant, 
low-labor-cost strategies. And the Works 
Constitution Act, establishing democrati-
cally elected works councils throughout 
the eastern economy, has given work force 
representatives a platform from which to 
push for desired outcomes (moderniza-
tion, high union membership density, 
better working conditions, and active 
engagement in management decision 
making). 
Open markets, backed by conservative/ 
neo-liberal political decision, push in one 
direction; the spread of western institu-
tions of interest representation (strong 
unions, codetermination structures, and 
rights) push in another direction. Thus, 
the German East has what the U.S. South 
has lacked: potentially positive prospects 
for unions even in wide-open economic 
circumstances. 
It was the failure to appreciate the 
leverage afforded by particular institu-
tions of interest representation (especially 
codetermination) that caused numerous 
German analysts to mistakenly identify or 
prophesize union decline in West Ger-
many in the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 
1980s, the comparative strength of Ger-
man unionism had belied these argu-
ments; British and Italian unionists, for 
example, began to push for participation 
rights of their own, at home and at the 
European level. But German unification 
has given the pessimists new life. Al-
though we may have been wrong before, 
they say, now German unions are really in 
trouble. 
We argue, in contrast, that the spread of 
West German laws and industrial relations 
institutions to the East means that favor-
able outcomes are possible for interest 
representation, for production organiza-
tion, and for the economic prospects of 
the new states. Possible, we argue, but not 
necessary. A great deal now depends on 
actor choice. If unions and works councils, 
for example, are flexible (as at our type A 
firm) and innovative (as in BQG develop-
ment), they will improve the chances for a 
future of modernization and substantial 
union/works council influence in eastern 
Germany. 
The interaction of markets, politics, and 
institutions is complex. It is especially 
complex in periods of institutional trans-
formation, when outcomes are more open 
and undetermined than in periods of 
institutional stability.23 The current period 
of institutional transformation in eastern 
Germany will prove highly instructive for 
those who study political economy and 
fraught with both peril and opportunity 
for those who make history by building 
new institutions. 
For a useful discussion of the importance of 
institutions and institutional change, see Steinmo and 
Thelen (1992). 
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